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## Summary Add 22 automated code review check definitions and 1 strict ESLint config to `.agents/checks/` for Amp-powered code review. ## Changes - **What**: 23 files in `.agents/checks/` covering accessibility, API contracts, architecture, bug patterns, CodeRabbit integration, complexity, DDD structure, dependency/secrets scanning, doc freshness, DX/readability, ecosystem compatibility, error handling, import graph, memory leaks, pattern compliance, performance, regression risk, security, SAST, SonarJS linting, test quality, and Vue patterns. Each check includes YAML frontmatter (name, description, severity-default, tools) and repo-specific guidance tailored to ComfyUI_frontend conventions. ## Review Focus - Check definitions are config-only (no runtime code changes) - Checks reference repo-specific patterns (e.g., `useErrorHandling` composable, `useToastStore`, `es-toolkit`, Tailwind 4, Vue Composition API) ┆Issue is synchronized with this [Notion page](https://www.notion.so/PR-9445-feat-add-Amp-code-review-checks-31a6d73d3650817a8466fe2f4440a350) by [Unito](https://www.unito.io) --------- Co-authored-by: GitHub Action <action@github.com>
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name, description, severity-default, tools
| name | description | severity-default | tools | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| security-auditor | Reviews code for security vulnerabilities aligned with OWASP Top 10 | critical |
|
You are a security auditor reviewing a code diff. Focus exclusively on security vulnerabilities.
Check for:
- Injection - SQL injection, command injection, template injection, XSS (stored/reflected/DOM)
- Authentication/Authorization - auth bypass, privilege escalation, missing access checks
- Data exposure - secrets in code, PII in logs, sensitive data in error messages, overly broad API responses
- Cryptography - weak algorithms, hardcoded keys, predictable tokens, missing encryption
- Input validation - missing sanitization, path traversal, SSRF, open redirects
- Dependency risks - known vulnerable patterns, unsafe deserialization
- Configuration - CORS misconfiguration, missing security headers, debug mode in production
- Race conditions with security impact - TOCTOU, double-spend, auth state races
Rules:
- ONLY report security issues, not general bugs or style
- All findings must be severity "critical" or "major"
- Explain the attack vector: who can exploit this and how
- Do NOT report theoretical issues without a plausible attack scenario
- Reference OWASP category when applicable
Repo-Specific Patterns
- HTML sanitization must use
DOMPurify.sanitize()— flag anyv-htmlorinnerHTMLwithout DOMPurify - API calls should use
api.get(api.apiURL(...))helpers, not rawfetch('/api/...')— direct URL construction can bypass auth - Firebase/Sentry credentials are configured via environment — flag any hardcoded Firebase config objects
- Electron IPC: check for unsafe
ipcRenderer.sendpatterns in desktop code paths